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Our objective is to investigate how alternative assumptions about preferences affect 
the process of economic growth. To do this, we analyze a neoclassical growth model 
under three alternative preference specifications: (i) time separable, (ii) catching up 
with the Joneses and (iii) habit formation. Departing from the time separable 
specification leads to important differences in the dynamic structure, the adjustment 
path followed by key economic variables, the correlation patterns implied by the time 
series generated by the model, and the speed of convergence to the new steady state. 
In the catching up with the Joneses economy the differences arise from a 
consumption externality, while in the habit formation economy the difference arises 
from the fact that agents not only smooth consumption but also its rate of change. 
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1. Introduction 
The concepts of habit and status have long been acknowledged as being important 
characteristics of human behavior.  The idea that the overall level of satisfaction derived from a 
given level of consumption depends, not only on the (current) consumption level itself, but also on 
how it compares to some benchmark level, is not new.  Origins of this proposition can be traced as 
far back as Smith (1759) and Veblen (1899), although it was not until Duesenberry (1949) that an 
effort was made to provide these ideas with some micro-theoretic foundations.  
Subsequent literature has identified two types of reference consumption levels that may 
characterize these “time non-separable” preference functions.  The first is based on an external 
criterion, expressed in terms of the past consumption of some outside reference group, typically the 
average consumption of the overall economy.  This is often referred to as “catching up with the 
Joneses” or “utility-interdependence”, and the agent described as being “outward-looking”.  The 
second is an internal criterion based on the individual’s own past consumption levels.  It is often 
referred to as characterizing “habit formation,” and the agent described as being “inward-looking”.  
A growing body of empirical evidence has confirmed the importance of time non-separable 
preferences.  Using panel data for the Netherlands, van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985) 
model both habit formation and utility interdependence.  Their results are compatible with the 
hypothesis that utility depends upon relative consumption, although they cannot exclude the 
possibility that utility reflects both relative and absolute consumption.  Using UK data, Osborn 
(1988) introduces a consumption specification that allows for seasonal variations and habit 
persistence, and finds the habit persistent terms to be jointly significant.  More recently, Fuhrer 
(2000) strongly rejects the hypothesis of time separable preferences.  Employing a utility function 
that assigns relative weights to both current consumption and an internal benchmark, he finds 80% 
of the weight should be attached to the latter.
1  In addition, Fuhrer and Klein (1998) present 
empirical evidence suggesting that habit formation is a relevant characteristic of consumption 
behavior among the G-7 countries.
  
                                                 
1However, his evidence is inconclusive with respect to the weights assigned to past consumption levels in forming the 
benchmark level.  He cannot reject the hypothesis that it is completely determined by the previous period’s consumption. 2 
An extensive literature on asset-pricing anomalies, most notably the equity premium puzzle, 
lends further credence to the level of benchmark consumption being a significant determinant of 
consumption behavior.  Habit-forming consumers dislike large and rapid cuts in consumption.  As a 
result, the premium that they will require to hold risky assets that might force a rapid cut in 
consumption will be large relative to that implied by the time-separable utility model.  This feature 
of time non-separable preferences is exploited by Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Gali (1994), 
and Campbell and Cochrane (1995) among others.   
Despite this evidence supporting the relevance of benchmark consumption levels for current 
consumption decisions, relatively few attempts have been made to introduce time non-separable 
preferences into the growth literature, where the specification of preferences as time-separable 
functions remains standard. One notable early exception is Ryder and Heal (1973), who introduced 
habit formation into the basic neoclassical growth model.  The focus of their paper is to study the 
role of habit formation in determining the generic nature of the transitional adjustment path, rather 
than in analyzing how habit formation influences the impact of structural changes on the evolution 
of the economy.  More recently, this approach has been pursued by Carroll, Overland, and Weil 
(1997, 2000), Fisher and Hof (2000), Alonso-Carrera, Caballé, and Raurich (2001a,b), although 
mostly under rigid production conditions that characterize the simplest endogenous growth model.
2 
However, time separable utility may yield misleading conclusions if in fact preferences are 
characterized by a high degree of complementarity between consumption at successive moments, as 
the empirical evidence suggests.  Thus, given the acknowledged limitations of the endogenous 
growth model, it is important to analyze further the role of interdependent preferences under more 
flexible production conditions.
3  To do so is the objective of the present paper.  Specifically, we 
consider the implications of time non-separable preferences using a one-sector neoclassical growth 
model in which labor experiences positive productivity growth.
4  Using this model, we analyze the 
                                                 
2An exception is Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b), who employ the hybrid neoclassical-AK production function introduced 
by Jones and Manuelli (1990). 
3 Despite its many appealing features the endogenous growth model has drawn sharp criticisms.  For example, Solow 
(1994) criticizes the constraints that this model imposes on the underlying technologies.  Jones (1995) and Backus, et al. 
(1992) criticize some of the empirical implications, involving “scale effects” that are not supported by the data.   
4The analysis easily extends to the more general non-scale technology studied by Eicher and Turnovsky (1999a, 1999b).  
In an earlier version of this paper we have introduced time non-separable preferences into such a model having non-
constant returns to scale. 3 
dynamic responses to two contrasting types of shocks: (i) an increase in the rate of productivity 
growth, and (ii) a destruction in the initial stock of capital.   
Of the studies cited, our analysis is closest to Carroll et al. (1997, 2000).  One of their 
objectives was to compare the introduction of time non-separable preferences with traditional (time-
separable) preferences, and to isolate the role of preferences they intentionally restrict the production 
side to the simplest possible form.  Thus they show that whereas with conventional preferences the 
basic AK technology they employ always places the economy on its balanced growth path, the 
introduction of time non-separable preferences introduces sluggishness into the system, so that the 
economy approaches its balanced growth equilibrium along a transitional path.   
But whether the production function has diminishing rather than constant returns to capital 
has important consequences.  First, the equilibrium transitional adjustment paths may now exhibit 
non-monotonic behavior, something that is not possible under the simple AK technology, but which 
nevertheless is important in replicating certain observed stylized facts.  Second, the implied 
adjustments to the two shocks considered in this paper, are qualitatively quite different, depending 
upon whether the productivity of capital is constant or diminishing.  
While Carroll et al. is a significant contribution, at least in one important case the implied 
transitional dynamics are inconsistent with available empirical evidence.  Specifically, they consider 
the consequences of a destruction in the initial capital stock.  They find that, whereas with traditional 
preferences this has no impact on the growth rate, with time non-separable preferences (both inward- 
and outward-looking) it involves an initial reduction in the growth rate, which then gradually 
increases during the transition and eventually returns to its pre-shock level.  In addition, the savings 
rate decreases on impact, and thereafter gradually increases monotonically over time. 
But experience pertaining to the destruction of capital in both Europe and Japan during 
World War II suggests that precisely the opposite adjustments in fact occurred.  Studies by 
Maddison (1994) and Wolf (1993) suggest that around 30% of the capital stock in Germany was 
destroyed between 1939 and 1945, while Saint-Paul (1993) estimates the war time destruction of 
capital in France to be between 20 and 35%.  Data compiled from Maddison (2001) suggests that 
average growth rates in European economies jumped to over 7% in 1950, and then gradually 4 
declined to around 4% by 1970.  Moreover, data from Maddison (1992) shows that the average 
European savings rate increased from just under 22% in 1950, peaking at over 28% in 1961, before 
slightly declining over the next decade.
5  Similar patterns for the growth rate and savings rate are 
documented by Christiano (1989) in the case of Japan.; see also King and Rebelo (1993). 
One of the main findings of this paper is that introducing time non-separable preferences, in 
conjunction with the neoclassical technology and the more flexible transitional dynamic adjustment 
paths it permits, can easily generate time paths for the growth rate and the savings rate during the 
early stages of the transition following an initial loss in the capital stock that will replicate this 
observed non-monotonic behavior.  Our analysis emphasizes how the transitional dynamics are 
driven by two opposing forces, one originating with preferences – what we call the “status effect” – 
the other arising from the diminishing returns to capital.  By restricting themselves to an AK 
production technology, Carroll et al. incorporate only the former effect.  This substantially restricts 
the dynamic behavior of the system to monotonic adjustments paths driven largely by preference 
parameters.  Thus, one of the general conclusions we draw is the potential importance of combining 
(i) more general preferences with (ii) a more flexible production technology, in replicating observed 
behavior.  But the fact that our equilibrium can generate more flexible dynamic paths comes at a 
price.  This is because the added flexibility reflects a higher order dynamic system that is too 
intractable to be studied analytically, but instead must be analyzed using numerical simulations.   
We should note that the non-monotonic transitional adjustment paths emphasized in this 
model could also be obtained using the hybrid technology employed by Alonso-Carrera, et al. 
(2001b), although their focus was on characterizing the equilibrium and efficiency issues, rather than 
analyzing transitional adjustment paths.  In this respect, our formulation differs in an important way.  
Alonso-Carrera et al. assume that the reference stock in utility is determined by the previous period’s 
consumption; it thus adjusts rapidly.  Hence, any empirical regularity that requires slow-moving 
habits cannot be explained by their specification.  The behavior of saving after World War II is one 
such case, and to replicate it within this class of model we need a slow-moving reference stock. 
We employ the utility function introduced by Abel (1990) in the context of asset pricing and 
                                                 
5 This empirical evidence is discussed and documented in greater detail by Alvarez-Cuadrado (2003).   5 
used by Carroll et al. (1997, 2000).  Following these authors we shall consider both externally and 
internally generated consumption benchmarks.  We shall compare their implications for the dynamic 
adjustment of the neoclassical growth model, both to one another as well as to those of the 
conventional time separable specification of preferences.  Departing from the basic growth model in 
the specification of preferences yields important differences in the equilibrium dynamics, the 
adjustment process of key economic variables, the correlation patterns implied by the model, and the 
speed of convergence to the new steady state. 
There are several key results that we wish to stress at the outset.  The first and most general 
finding is that the differences between assuming the conventional time separable utility function, on 
the one hand, and time non-separable preference functions, on the other, are substantial.  By contrast, 
the difference between assuming that the reference consumption level is formed by looking outwards 
or inwards is relatively small, although it does depend upon the shock imposed upon the economy.
6   
Second, in contrast to the AK model, introducing time non-separable utility may increase, 
rather than decrease, the speed of convergence.  This depends upon how rapidly the reference stock 
adjusts relative to the intrinsic adjustment speed in the rest of the economy.  Third, the introduction 
of consumption habits causes substantial intertemporal shifts in the time paths for consumption and 
savings following structural shocks to the economy.  In the case of an increase in the productivity 
growth rate it leads to a smaller short-run increase in consumption and a larger increase in saving, 
which over time generates an eventual larger increase in consumption.  The impact of habit is even 
more dramatic in the case where the shock takes the form of a destruction of capital.  Fourth, the 
time path of welfare resulting from a structural change can be decomposed into the effect on the 
absolute consumption level, together with the effect on current consumption relative to the reference 
level.  This can lead to substantially different welfare implications from those obtained for 
conventional preferences, depending upon how rapidly the reference stock is assumed to adjust.  
Consequently, the policy and welfare implications of structural changes, conducted under the 
conventional assumption of time separable preferences may turn out to be quite misleading if in fact 
preferences are time non-separable. Fifth, the initial stages of the dynamics are particularly sensitive 
                                                 
6 It also depends upon the assumption that labor is supplied inelastically.   6 
to the speed of adjustment of the reference consumption level; they are less sensitive to the weight 
assigned to the reference consumption level in utility.  Sixth, the presence of a reference 
consumption level can have a very different effect on the transitional dynamics in a neoclassical 
model from its effect in the endogenous growth model.  This depends upon how non-monotonic the 
transitional paths are in the former, which in part is sensitive to the adjustment speed of habits.  
Finally, time non-separable preferences provide interesting insight into the growth-saving relation.  
In contrast to the conventional model where saving is seen as the engine of growth, our model 
reverses this causal relation, suggesting that growth leads to saving.  This behavior is consistent with 
the European evidence cited earlier, as well as the more formal causality tests conducted by Carroll 
and Weil (1994) and Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000).   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the basic structure of the model, 
introducing our two versions of time non-separable preferences.  Section 3 then characterizes the 
corresponding macroeconomic behavior of the economy.  Section 4 conducts a numerical analysis, 
comparing the dynamic responses of the economy under the alternative specifications of preferences, 
while Section 5 carries out some sensitivity analysis.  Section 6 compares the implications of the 
present neoclassical model with those obtained under the more restrictive AK production structure.  
The conclusions are summarized in Section 7, while an appendix provides some technical details. 
2.   The Model 
Consider an economy populated by N  identical and infinitely lived households that grows at 
the exogenous rate NN n =  .  At any point in time, households derive utility from the comparison 
of their current consumption level relative to a reference consumption level.  The individual 

















∞∞ − −−    
 Ω≡ =   −−     
∫∫    (1) 
where Ci and Hi are household i’s current consumption and reference consumption level (habits), 7 
respectively.
7  Following Ryder and Heal (1973) we impose non-satiation in utility, restricting γ  to 
lie in the range 01 γ ≤< .
8  As we can see from the second expression in (1), agents derive utility 
from a geometric weighted average of absolute and relative consumption, these corresponding to the 
polar cases,  0 γ = , and  1 γ → , respectively.  In general, ε  and γ  interact to determine the 
(consumption) intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), having the property that it varies with 
the horizon considered.  From (2) below we see that as the time horizon shrinks to zero, habits are 
predetermined and fixed, and therefore the IES converges to the expression for the conventional 
time-separable case, 1 ε .  At the other extreme, as the time horizon increases to infinity, habits fully 
adjust to a change in consumption.  Setting  ii HC =  in (1) this implies a long-run intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution equal to  () 1( 1 ) γ εγ +−.
9  This contrasts with the conventional case,  0 γ = , 
where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 ε , remains constant and independent of the 
horizon considered.  Thus we see that the long-run IES under time non-separable preferences 
exceeds the conventional IES if and only if 11 ε < , as empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggests. 
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i i CC N
= =∑  denotes the economy-wide average consumption of agents.  Equations (1) and 
(2) encompass the three specifications of preferences that we wish to consider, being identified by 
different values of the parameters γ  and φ .  The benchmark conventional preferences are obtained 
by setting  0 γ =  in (1), in which case the reference stock as represented by (2) is irrelevant.  Setting 
0 φ =  identifies the outward-looking agent, for whom the reference stock is formed as an 
exponentially declining weighted average of past economy-wide average levels of consumption.   
                                                 
7 The form of the utility specification (1) raises questions about whether or not the necessary conditions that we derive 
are in fact optimal.  This problem is characteristic of all the literature that employs the utility function in (1).   In the case 
of outward-looking agents, 
i H  is an externality and the utility function is concave in  i C .  Given that the constraints are 
concave functions, the first order conditions suffice to ensure a maximum.  By contrast, in the case of inward-looking 
agents (habit formation), the utility function is not jointly concave in both  i C  and
i H , and thus the first-order conditions 
may not yield a maximum.  In this case the paper by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b) argues that the interior solution will 
ensure utility maximization if one restricts  1 ε > , consistent with the empirical evidence.   
8 Non-satiation is guaranteed if an increase in a uniformly maintained consumption level increases utility, i.e. if 
()() ,, 0 Ci i Hi i UC C UC C +> . 
9See also Carroll et al. (2000). 8 
Since agents are atomistic, they ignore the effect of their individual consumption decisions on the 
evolution of the reference stock, taking it as exogenous.  Setting  1 φ =  corresponds to the inward-
looking agent, for whom the reference stock is an exponentially declining weighted average of his 
own past levels of consumption.   
The differences in behavior between the latter two cases arise from the fact that in the 
outward-looking economy the reference stock is an externality, whereas in the inward-looking 
economy it is not.  The outward-looking agent ignores the effect that his present consumption 
induces on his future utility through its effect on the average consumption.  In contrast, the inward-
looking agent fully internalizes the effect of his current consumption decision on the future evolution 
of his reference stock and thus on his future welfare. 




ii i HC C H
φφ ρ
− =−          ( 3 )  
The speed of adjustment, ρ, parameterizes the relative importance of recent consumption in 
determining the reference stock.  Therefore, higher values of  ρ  lead to a higher influence of current 
consumption in the determination of the future reference stock, or alternatively to a lower level of 
persistence in habits. 
Individual output is determined by the agent’s capital stock,  i K , and his level of inelastically 
supplied labor,  i L .  We shall assume that labor productivity grows at the exogenous constant rate, 
AA g =  .  Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, individual output is determined by, 
()
() 1
ii i YA L K
σ σ α
− =   01 σ < <       ( 4 )  
The technology exhibits diminishing marginal product to each private factor and constant returns to 
scale in the two factors, capital and labor in efficiency units.   
Final output can be either consumed currently, or saved and transformed into additional 
capital to yield future consumption.  Assuming that the existing capital stock depreciates at a rate, 
δ , agent i’s capital stock evolves according to the accumulation relationship 9 
( ) iii i KYC n K δ =−−+         ( 5 )  
The agent chooses his consumption, rate of capital accumulation, and rate of change of the 
reference stock to maximize (1), subject to the production function, (4), the accumulation equation, 
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where  1i λ  denotes the agent’s shadow value of capital,  2i λ  is the shadow value of the agent’s 






−βtλ2iHi = 0       ( 6 d )  
Equation (6a) equates the utility of an additional unit of consumption adjusted by its impact 
on the future reference stock to the shadow value of capital, while equation (6b) is the standard 
intertemporal allocation condition equating the marginal product of capital to the rate of return on 
consumption. Equation (6c) is an additional intertemporal allocation condition equating the marginal 
disutility of an additional unit of habit measured in terms of its shadow value to the cost of habit.   
Equations (6) nest the optimality conditions for the three hypotheses regarding preferences 
that we wish to consider.  Internal preferences ( 1) φ =  require the monitoring of two state variables, 
and this continues to apply as long as some positive weight is assigned to the agent’s own past 
consumption in his reference stock ( 0) φ > .  In the case of a purely outward-looking consumption 
benchmark  (0 ) φ = ,  2i λ  is irrelevant, although the agent still needs to take account of the fact that 
utility depends upon current consumption relative to the external benchmark.  In the conventional 
case of time-separable preferences (0 ) γ = , (6c) implies  2 0 i λ ≡ , in which case (6a) and (6b) reduce 10 
to the usual optimality conditions, and the evolution of the benchmark consumption level becomes 
irrelevant.  The equilibrium dynamics corresponding to these three cases will be discussed below. 
3.   Macroeconomic equilibrium  
  We now proceed to derive the macroeconomic equilibria.  With all individuals being 
identical, aggregate capital, output, consumption, and the reference consumption stock are given by 
,  ii KN K YN Y ≡≡ ,  i CN C ≡  and  i HN H ≡ , respectively.  Normalizing  i L  to 1, and summing across 
households, yields the aggregate production function, 
()
1 YA N K
σ σ α
− =         ( 7 )  
We define a balanced growth path as being one along which all variables grow at a constant 
rate. With capital being accumulated from final output, along a balanced growth path K /Y  remains 
constant.  Differentiating the aggregate production function (7), we obtain the long-run equilibrium 
growth rates of capital and output,  ˆ  K 
*and  ˆ  Y 
*, 
** ˆˆ YKg n == +         ( 8 )  
yielding the standard property that the equilibrium growth rate equals the population growth rate 
plus the exogenous growth rate of labor productivity.   
  Following our definition of the balanced growth path, it is convenient to write the system in 
terms of the following normalized variables  , , k K AN y Y AN c C AN ≡ ≡≡ , and hH A N ≡ , all 
expressed in units of effective labor, which remain constant in steady-state equilibrium.  In addition, 
with all agents being identical, we may drop the subscript i on the shadow values and consider 
21 ii q λ λ ≡ , which also is stationary.   
Taking the time derivative of (6a), combining with (6b) and (6c), imposing the equilibrium 
condition  i CCC N == , and aggregating across households, the equilibrium path for the growth 
rate of aggregate consumption is, 
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  (9) 11 
which describes the evolution of aggregate consumption in terms of the productivity of capital and 
the ratio of consumption to the reference stock. 
Taking the time derivatives of k, c, h, and q and combining these definitions with (3), (5), and 
(9), the dynamic behavior of the economy can be described by the following system of differential 
equations in k, c, h, and q: 
()
1 kk c n g k
σ αδ
− =− − + +           ( 1 0 a )  
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 (10b) 
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       (10d) 
  In the case of the inward-looking consumption benchmark, the dynamics of all four variables 
are interdependent.  In contrast, if the benchmark is outward-looking, the dynamics decouple as 
follows.  Setting  0 φ = , (10a) – (10c) form an autonomous sub-system in k, c, and h, but independent 
of q.  Given the evolution of k, c, and h, the shadow value q then evolves in accordance with (10d), 
but is of no consequence insofar as the macrodynamic equilibrium is concerned.  If  0 γ = , so that the 
reference stock is irrelevant to utility, the dynamics decouple further.  As noted,  2 0 λ ≡  implying 
0 q ≡ .  Now (10a) and (10b) jointly determine the evolution of k and c, independently of h, in the 
conventional way.  Given the time path of c, (10c) then determines the evolution of h, but this is 
irrelevant insofar as the equilibrium is concerned.
10 
Imposing the stationary conditions,  0 chqk = ===    in (10a) – (10d) we can determine the 
steady-state values of stationary variables in the following recursive manner. First, (10c) yields the 
consumption-habit ratio.  Second, given ch , (10d) determines the ratio of the shadow values, q, in 
terms of normalized capital, k.  Third, substituting this stationary value of q  into (10b) yields a 
                                                 
10Note that the dynamics of k and c also proceed independently if  0 ρ = , so that the reference stock is fixed.   
 12 
quadratic equation in normalized capital, one of the roots of which can be eliminated by imposing 
the transversality condition (6d); see Appendix.  Finally (10a) determines the steady-state level of 
normalized consumption.  Letting tildes denote steady-state values, we may summarize these 
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      (11d) 
The following observations about the steady state can be made.  First, equations (11a) – (11c) 
are independent of φ , implying that the steady-state values of normalized capital, consumption, and 
habits are the same whether the reference consumption level is formed internally or externally.  Note 
from (11d) that  0 q <  .  Intuitively, because an increase in the level of habits, given current 
consumption, is welfare-reducing, the shadow value of the reference stock is negative.  Second, in 
the absence of productivity growth ( 0 g = ), (11c) implies ch =   , so that the stationary consumption 
level coincides with the reference level.  In that case (11a) reduces to the standard modified golden 
rule stock of capital, consistent with the early result of Ryder and Heal (1973).  The equilibrium 
stock of capital will be independent of γ , the relative weight attributed to habit in utility, and will be 
the same for all specifications of preferences.  Third, in the event of positive productivity growth, 
( 0 g > ), ch >    by an amount that is inversely related to ρ , the speed with which the reference stock 
adjusts to recent consumption experience.  In that case, the introduction of benchmark consumption 
into utility unambiguously increases the equilibrium normalized stock of capital if and only if  1 ε > . 
The dynamics can be approximated by the fourth-order system presented below: 13 
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With k and h being sluggish variables while c and q are free to jump instantaneously, in order for this 
system to have a unique stable adjustment path (i.e. be saddle-path stable) we require that it has 2 
negative (stable) and 2 positive (unstable) eigenvalues.  It can be easily verified that the sign of the 
determinant of the matrix in (12) is positive.  This, however, is consistent with there being either 2 
negative and 2 positive root, 4 positive, or 4 negative roots.  To ensure that we do in fact have two 
positive roots requires extra conditions, which unfortunately turn out to be intractable.  In all of our 
simulations, however, we find that (12) exhibits saddlepoint behavior and we shall focus our 
attention on that case, as being the plausible one.  However, the stable roots may quite plausibly turn 
out to be complex, in which case the dynamics involves cyclical behavior.
11 
Our objective is to contrast the dynamic behavior of the economy under the following three 
specifications of preferences: (i) conventional preferences ( 0 γ = ), (ii) external habits ( 0 φ = ) and 
(iii) internal habits ( 1 φ = ).  Since these scenarios differ only in terms of their demand 
characteristics, consumption behavior provides the crucial determinant of the differences in the 
adjustment processes undertaken by the economy in the three cases.  Two key concepts to 
understanding this include the “rate of return effect” and the “status effect”.  These can be seen most 
conveniently by focusing on equation (10b) in the two cases of conventional preferences and 
external habits.  Assuming for convenience  0 ng δ = ==  and letting  ˆ cc c ≡  , these become: 
(i)   Conventional preferences 
{}
1 ˆ (1 ) ck
σ σ αβ
ε
− =− −         ( 1 3 a )  
                                                 
11The stability conditions in the case of the external consumption benchmark, when the dynamics reduces to a third order 






<   , i.e. the equilibrium consumption-income ratio be less 
than  σ , is a plausible sufficient condition to ensure saddle-point stablilty.  Under our assumptions, the case of 
conventional time-separable preferences is always saddle-point stable. 14 
(ii)   Outward-looking consumption benchmark 
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      (13b) 
For conventional preferences, (13a), the rate of growth of consumption is determined by the 
difference between the real interest rate and the rate of time preference, multiplied by the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a measure of the agent’s willingness to shift consumption 
across periods.  A high marginal product of capital will lead to a lower level of current consumption 
and therefore to a high rate of consumption growth; we call this the “rate of return effect”.
12  For 
outward-looking agents, the reference stock is an additional variable that interacts in the 
determination of the consumption growth rate.  For empirically plausible values of ε  (>1), if 
consumption is below habit, consumption in the outward-looking economy will grow slower than in 
the conventional economy, and vice versa.  We call this the “status effect” and it counteracts the 
“rate of return effect”, constraining the deviations in consumption from its historical level.   
4.   Numerical analysis of some transitional paths. 
To understand better the transitional dynamics we calibrate the model to reproduce some key 
features of actual economies.  Table 1 summarizes the parameters upon which our simulations are 
based.  Most of these are standard and non-controversial.  In this regard,  0.65 σ = , implying a labor 
share of income of 65%, rate of time preference  0.04 β = , instantaneous intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, 10 . 4 ε = , population growth rate  0.015 n = , and depreciation rate,  0.05 δ =  are well 
documented, while being a neoclassical model, the normalization  1 α =  is unimportant.
13 
The critical parameters pertain to the relative importance of the reference stock, γ , and the 
speed with which it is adjusted, ρ .  We follow Carroll et. al (1997) and set  0.5, 0.2 γ ρ ==  as 
benchmark values.  However, information on these parameters is sparse, and we therefore conduct 
                                                 
12 This effect is a combination of the “Solow effect”, substitution effect, and the human-wealth effect. As described by 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), the “Solow effect” implies that, given a constant saving rate, a low level of capital 
will lead to a high rate of growth simply because the average product of capital is high. The other two effects tend to 
increased current savings (decrease current consumption) increasing investment and growth. 
13Since we are dealing with a closed economy without a government sector savings and investment coincide and we use 
the terms savings and investment interchangeably. 15 
some sensitivity analysis based on other circumstantial evidence.  Thus, based on the estimates 
provided by Fuhrer (2000), we also increase  to 0.8 γ .  In addition, his results suggest a much faster 
speed of adjustment in the determination of the reference stock, although this estimate is obtained 
with a low degree of precision.  A faster speed of convergence is also suggested by the application of 
this model to the equity premium puzzle literature, and in light of this we increase ρ  to 0.5, 0.8, 1.5 
and 5.
14  But these adjustment speeds imply rapid convergence speeds, and from this standpoint we 
also consider  0.02 ρ =  as well. 
Finally, for expositional purposes it is convenient to treat the benchmark technology as one 
of zero productivity growth ( 0 g = ).  This has the advantage that steady-state values are identical 
across specifications.  From Table 2 we see that the base equilibrium implies an output-capital ratio 
of 0.3, savings rate of 21.6% (consumption-output ratio of 78.4%), and a growth rate of 1.5%.   
4.1   Speed of convergence 
A particularly interesting aspect of the results pertains to the eigenvalues.  These are crucial 
in determining the economy’s speed of convergence, which has been the subject of both extensive 
empirical and theoretical analysis.  The empirical evidence on convergence speeds is mixed.  Early 
influential work by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) yielded 
estimates of around 2-3% per annum, which became a benchmark estimate, although it conflicts with 
the predictions of the simplest neoclassical models, of around 10%.  Subsequent work suggests that 
the rates of convergence are more variable, being sensitive to the time period and the set of 
countries, and a wider range of empirical estimates have since been obtained.
15   
Many models, including Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997, 2000) have the property that the 
transitional dynamics are determined by a one-dimensional stable manifold.  That structure imposes 
the restriction that all the variables converge to their respective steady states at the same constant 
speed equal to the magnitude of the unique stable eigenvalue.  By contrast, if the stable manifold is 
                                                 
14There is some difficulty in translating empirical estimates of these parameters, which are based on discrete-time models 
to our continuous-time formulation 
15For example, Islam (1995) estimates the rate of convergence to be 4.7% for nonoil countries and 9.7% for OECD 
countries.  Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), use a GMM estimator to correct for sources of inconsistency due to 
correlated country-specific effects and endogenous explanatory variables and obtain a convergence rate of around 10%. 
Evans (1997) using an alternative method to generate consistent estimates of convergence finds them to be around 6%.   16 
two-dimensional (as for either of the habit formation cases) the speed of convergence of any variable 
at any point of time is a weighted average of the two stable eigenvalues.  Over time, the weight of 
the smaller (more negative) eigenvalue declines, so that the larger of the two stable (negative) 
eigenvalues describes the asymptotic speed of convergence.
16  The flexibility provided by the 
additional eigenvalue allows the system to match some features of the data related with the timing of 
key variables and growth rates along the transitional path.   
In a few instances the stable eigenvalues come in complex conjugate pairs,  12 , ai b µ µ = ± .  
In such a case, general solution for a variable is of the form  ( ) cos( )
at xt x B e b t κ
− = ++  , where  ,  B κ  
are arbitrary constants, implying cyclical behavior with periodicity 2 b π .  Because the transitional 
path oscillates about its steady state, the measure of convergence speed proposed by Eicher and 
Turnovsky (1999b) is inconvenient because it becomes infinite each time  ( ) x t  cycles through its 
equilibrium value, x  .  In this case more appropriate measures of the rate of convergence are either 
a or the modulus of the roots, 
22 ra b =+ , both of which are constant over time.  
Turning to the base equilibrium in Table 2, the two eigenvalues under conventional time 
separable preferences are  0.0626 −  and  0.20 − .  However, the dynamics of capital (and 
consumption), on the one hand, and the reference consumption level, on the other, decouple.  As a 
result, capital and consumption converge at the constant rate of 6.26%, while the reference stock, 
which by assumption is irrelevant to the consumption-investment allocation, converges at 20%.  In 
contrast, when preferences depend upon benchmark consumption, the stable dynamics of the entire 
system becomes interdependent, and the convergence of capital and the reference consumption level 
occur jointly.
17  Moreover, in this case for both specifications of preferences, the two stable roots are 
complex, indicating that the stable adjustment path is one of cyclical behavior.  However, because 
the imaginary component is small, (0.019, 0.029 respectively), the periodicity of the cycles are 
extremely long, (330, 216 years respectively) so that for practical purposes the transitional paths are 
essentially non-cyclical.   
Table 2 suggests that an economy with outward looking agents converges more rapidly than 
                                                 
16 See Eicher and Turnovsky (1999a) for further discussion of this point. 
17 In early terminology of dynamic systems, the system would be said to be “indecomposable”. 17 
does one having inward-looking agents.  This is because an inward-looking agent, who takes account 
of the impact of his current consumption on the reference level, in effect has a lower intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, thereby slowing down the rate of convergence.  To provide some intuition, 
consider an economy that begins with the kh  ratio below its equilibrium level.  In this case, the 
adjustment requires additional capital accumulation and/or a reduction in the reference consumption 
stock.  An inward-looking agent considers not only the effect of a reduction in consumption on the 
rate of capital accumulation, but also its dampening effect on habits.  But an outward-looking agent 
ignores the effect of his action on the future evolution of the reference stock and therefore reduces 
consumption below its optimal level.  Under-consumption when the stable growth path requires 
capital accumulation accelerates the convergence process. 
The interesting, and perhaps counter-intuitive observation, is that the introduction of a 
reference consumption stock, which one can view as a source of sluggishness, actually speeds up the 
dynamics.  The speed of adjustment, -0.106, implicit in the real part of the two complex roots in the 
external case is essentially some kind of average of the two eigenvalues  0.0626 −  and  0.20 −  of the 
conventional system.  Intuitively, the interaction of the capital dynamics with the more rapid 
dynamics of benchmark consumption in the indecomposable economy means that the convergence 
speed of the former is increased, while that of the latter slows down.   
Table 3 performs some sensitivity analysis with regard to the eigenvalues across a wide range 
of values of γ  and ρ .  Overall, we see that the asymptotic speeds of convergence span the range 2% 
to 12%.  Asymptotic speeds of convergence of around 2% can be mimicked only by taking 
implausibly low values of ρ  of around 0.02.  But the model can easily replicate convergence speeds 
of up to 10%, consistent with the more recent empirical evidence, for wide ranges of γ  and ρ .
18   
In general, the relation between ρ  and the speed of convergence of the real variables is non-
monotonic.
19  The asymptotic speed of convergence of the overall system increases with ρ for low 
values of ρ , and decreases with  ρ  for high values of  ρ .  Taking  0.02 ρ = , for conventional 
                                                 
18 We may note that even though the AK model always reduces the convergence speed (making it finite), for the 
comparable parameterization to our benchmark, it implies a faster speed of asymptotic convergence than is obtained here 
(14.5% vs. around 10%).  
19 For some extreme values, Table 3 implies that the asymptotic speed of convergence of the inward-looking economy 
slightly exceeds that of the outward-looking economy.  In these cases, the other eigenvalue is substantially larger (in 
magnitude) to suggest that the outward-looking economy will in fact still converge more rapidly for long periods of time. 18 
preferences, capital converges at 6.26%, while reference consumption now converges at only 2%.  
With external preferences and  0.5 γ = , the eigenvalues are now both real (-0.0569, -0.022), so that 
asymptotically, the entire system -- capital, output, and benchmark consumption -- converge at 2.2%.  
In this case, the slow evolution of benchmark consumption slows everything down.  At the other 
extreme, as ρ →∞, so that hc → , the time non-separable utility model converges to the standard 
model, although with a higher IES.  As a consequence, the convergence speed again converges to 
that of the standard model, although adjusted now for the higher IES.   
We now focus on the dynamic response to two shocks: (i) a 2% increase in the growth rate of 
labor productivity, (ii) a 10% destruction in capital.  These shocks differ in interesting ways.  The 
first is non-stationary, in the sense of generating a permanent increase in the equilibrium growth rate 
so that per capita quantities grow indefinitely.  The second leaves the steady-state growth rate 
unchanged at zero, so that per capita quantities converge to some stationary level. 
4.2   Increase in the growth rate of productivity of labor 
We begin by considering the evolution of the three economies in response to a permanent 
increase in the growth rate of labor productivity from 0 to 2%.  The three panels of Table 4 
summarize the short-run and long-run effects of the change on key economic variables for the three 
specifications of preferences.  Because of the increase in the growth rate, per capita quantities grow 
indefinitely, converging to a balanced growth path rather than to a steady-state level.  Moreover, the 
steady-state values of the stationary variables [defined per effective unit of labor], while convenient 
for deriving the formal solution, are of little economic interest per se.  Consequently, Panel A in 
Table 4 describes the effect of the 2% increase in productivity growth on the per capita levels of 
consumption, capital, output, and savings, both initially immediately following the shock, and after 
50 years.  Panel B summarizes the effects on growth rates and ratios, both of which are stationary. 
The third panel summarizes the effects of the shocks on two measures of welfare.  The 
change in intertemporal welfare, reported in the final column, measures the change in the 
representative agent’s optimized utility function Ω [given in (1)], when  , ii CH  are evaluated along 
the equilibrium path.  The welfare gains reported are equivalent variation measures, calculated as the 19 
percentage change in the permanent flow of consumption necessary to equate the initial level of 
welfare to what they would be following the structural changes.  Details of this calculation are 
provided in the Appendix.  As long as the equilibrium growth rate, g, is not too large (as in our 
simulations) the intertemporal welfare change, as measured by discounted utility is finite. 
In addition, we report the effects on welfare at different instants of time along the equilibrium 
growth path.  In the Appendix we show that converting the utility measures into equivalent 
permanent changes in consumption flows, we can conveniently express the change in instantaneous 
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    (14) 
where  12 , gg  are the equilibrium growth rates before and after the structural change.  Note that if 
12 gg ≠ , the pre-shock and post-shock paths of instantaneous utility will diverge, ultimately growing 
at different asymptotic rates.  Accordingly, the consumption level necessary to compensate for the 
change grows over time to reflect the growth differential.  In the case of conventional preferences, 
0 γ = , the time path for instantaneous utility simply mirrors that of instantaneous consumption.  
However, when utility depends in part upon benchmark consumption, the percentage change in 
instantaneous utility comprises two components; the proportionate change in absolute consumption, 
together with the proportionate change in consumption relative to its benchmark level.  
We proceed as follows.  We first describe the responses under conventional specification of 
preferences when only the “rate of return effect” is present, and then highlight the differences 
resulting from the introduction of time non-separable preferences and its associated “status effect”.    
From Table 4, we see that a permanent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity of 
2% raises the steady-state growth rates of per capita capital stock, output (and consumption) by 2%.  
After 50 years these higher growth rates accumulate to increases in the per capita stocks of capital, 
output, consumption, and savings of 50.7%, 121%, 128%, and 95%, respectively, over what they 
would have been in the absence of the enhanced productivity growth.  The representative agent, 
being forward-looking, anticipates this future increase in growth in productive capacity, and 20 
immediately increases his current consumption level by 14.3%.  With the capital stock being fixed 
instantaneously, and the growth in productivity occurring over time, output remains unchanged in 
the short run.  Thus the immediate increase in consumption comes at the expense of an initial 
dramatic decline in the savings rate from 21.7% to 10.4%, leading to an initial decline in the per 
capita growth rate of capital of 1.9 percentage points.  However, this is more than offset by the 
enhanced productivity growth rate so that the growth rate of per capita output initially increases by 
0.6 percentage points.  Over time, the accumulated effects of the higher productivity growth rate 
generates sufficient additional output so that eventually there are increases in both savings and 
consumption, despite the slight long-run decline in the saving rate.   
Figure 1 illustrates the adjustment of key variables in the economy.  Panel a shows the initial 
decline in the per capita capital stock, which after around 15 years has fallen to around 90% of its 
pre-shock level.  Thereafter, the accumulated increase in output resulting from the higher 
productivity growth permits growth in both the per capita stock of capital and consumption to occur.  
After around 25 years the per capita stock of capital recovers its pre-shock level, and it will then 
increase steadily thereafter.  Per capita output growth, implied by Panel d increases steadily from 
0.6% to 2%.  The time paths for consumption and savings are illustrated in Figs. 1b, 1c, and 1e. 
Figure 1 also highlights how the time paths for both inward-looking and outward-looking 
economies track each other closely, although they are quite distinct from those of the conventional 
case, a fact that is also reflected in Table 4.  When preferences are conditioned by the presence of a 
reference consumption level, the initial response is a relatively smaller increase in consumption and 
therefore, given initial output, a relatively smaller decline in savings.  The initial increase in 
consumption is limited by the “status effect”, meaning that the utility associated with any short-run 
increase in consumption relative to the reference stock is dampened, thereby reducing the incentive 
to consume.  In the case of inward-looking agents, the initial increase in the consumption level is 
reduced to 8.1%, thus allowing a 32.5% decrease in savings, relative to its initial level, and a 
decrease in the savings rate from 21.7% to 15.3%.  This leads to a substantially smaller initial 
reduction in the growth of capital, relative to the conventional case, as seen in Fig. 1a.  This is 
reflected in the growth rate of output in Fig. 1d, which now increases by 0.9 percentage points.  21 
After around 10 years the capital stock in the inward-looking economy will exceed that of the 
conventional economy by a sufficient amount so that its consumption level will begin to overtake it 
as well, as seen in Fig. 1b.   
  The case of an externally generated reference consumption level operates in much the same 
way, though with one difference.  This is because the agent now ignores the fact that current 
consumption also contributes positively to the evolution of his reference consumption stock reducing 
his future satisfaction.  As a result, the transition in this case is characterized by initial over-
consumption relative to the inward-looking economy, followed by subsequent under-consumption, 
during later phases of the transition (see Fig. 1b).  However, these differences are very small, the 
initial increase in consumption being 9% rather than 8.1%, and declining over time. 
A striking feature of the dynamics is the non-monotonic adjustment in the ratio ch , which 
follow similar paths for both types of reference points.  Starting from the steady state with  1 ch= , 
the initial jump in c with h sluggish leads to an immediate increase in this ratio to 1.09.  With 
0.20 ρ = , h begins to adjust at a faster rate than does c, so that ch  begins to decline.  After about 8 
years of increased technological growth, output and consumption begin to increase at a faster rate, so 
that ch  begins to increase, eventually increasing to 10% above its original value. 
The time paths for instantaneous welfare corresponding to the alternative specifications for 
preferences are illustrated in Fig. 1g.  We immediately see from (14) that the initial 14.3% increase 
in consumption under conventional preferences ( 0 γ = ) leads to a corresponding initial 14.3% 
increase in welfare.  Both forms of time non-separable preferences lead to a smaller increase in 
initial consumption of only around 9%, which raises utility by the same percentage amount.  But in 
addition, with habits being sluggish (and fixed instantaneously) this raises short-run relative 
consumption by around 9%, so that overall, welfare increases by around 18% in the short run.
20  
Over time, as habits begin to catch up to current consumption, the relative consumption term in (14) 
declines to 1.1 and asymptotically, welfare changes all converge to the common  long-run growth 
rate of 2%.  After 50 years, the welfare levels for both external and internal references are virtually 
                                                 
20 With external habits leading to slightly more consumption in the short run, they are therefore associated with slightly 
higher short-run welfare. 22 
identical, both being around 157% higher than they would have been without the higher productivity 
growth rate, and significantly higher gains than with conventional preferences.  The different 
intertemporal measures of welfare reflect the differences along the transitional time paths.  Again 
both time non-separable preference functions suggest similar welfare gains of around 53.3%, also 
significantly higher than the 39.4% implied by conventional preferences.   
These results have two interesting implications.  First, despite the fact that agents having time 
non-separable preferences enjoy smaller short-run absolute consumption gains than those having 
conventional preferences, in response to the growth in productivity, they nevertheless enjoy larger 
short-run utility gains.
21  This is because they also derive benefits from the relative change involved.  
Second, if preferences are in fact time non-separable as much recent empirical evidence suggests, the 
welfare conclusions obtained under the assumption of time separability could be highly misleading, 
substantially understating the true benefits to the agents. 
4.3  Destruction of Capital   
Table 5 summarizes the effects of a temporary 10% destruction of capital, brought about by a 
war or natural disaster such as an earthquake.  Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics in the benchmark 
case of zero productivity growth.  This shock is stationary, in the sense that following the shock, the 
economy ultimately returns to its initial growth rate.  We see that for all three specifications of 
preferences this leads to an initial reduction in output of 3.6%.  In the case of conventional 
preferences, this causes an initial reduction in consumption of around 4.4% and savings of around 
1%, leading to an initial increase in the savings rate of around 0.6 percentage points to around 
22.3%, and to a gradual restoration of the capital stock at its original level.  The initial decline in 
consumption leads to an equivalent initial reduction in welfare of around 4.4%.  However, the 
monotonic increase in consumption back to its pre-shock level reduces the present value of the 
overall welfare loss throughout the transition to approximately 1.7%. 
The introduction of an internally generated reference stock leads to substantial differences in 
                                                 
21 This comparison needs to be interpreted with care.  We do not mean to compare the welfare of agents having time-
separable utility functions with those of agents having time-dependent utility functions.  Instead, we are suggesting that 
an analysis based on time-separable utility would understate the short-run benefits derived by an agent having time-
dependent utility. 23 
the adjustment paths following a temporary destruction of capital.  The initial reduction in output is 
again around 3.6%.  This time, the existence of the reference stock inhibits the decline in initial 
consumption, which now falls by only 3.3%, leading to an immediate decrease in the savings rate of 
0.3 percentage points, reducing it to 21.4%.  In the short run, following the initial destruction, the 
“status effect” limits the capacity of consumption to adjust.  Therefore, savings increases faster than 
does output so that the savings rate begins to rise.  After about 12 years, the growth rate of savings 
catches up to that of output and the savings rate peaks at around 22.1%.  Thereafter, as the effects of 
the past increases in consumption are incorporated into the reference stock, current consumption 
increases and the savings rate declines, doing so monotonically until the new equilibrium is reached. 
  When the consumption reference stock is externally generated, agents ignore the fact that a 
reduction in current consumption lowers the future reference stock, and this leads to a transition 
characterized by under-consumption.  The initially larger reduction in consumption allows for an 
immediate increase in the saving rate of 0.1 percentage point, thereafter the adjustment path is 
qualitatively similar to the inward-looking case.   
  The contrast in the behavior of the savings rate between the time non-separable and 
conventional preferences is striking and is a reflection of the fact that that the “status effect” initially 
dominates the “rate of return effect” for our chosen benchmark parameters.  Table 5.C examines the 
sensitivity of this finding to the two key preference parameters, ρ  and γ .  The results suggest that 
while the result is relatively insensitive to ρ , it is much more sensitive to γ .  Indeed if the weight 
on habits is reduced to  0.2 γ = , then the rate of return effect dominates and all three specifications of 
preferences lead to an initial increase in the savings rate. 
  The time paths for instantaneous welfare corresponding to the alternative specifications for 
preferences are illustrated in Fig. 2g.  Using (14), we see that for conventional preferences,  0 γ = , 
the time path for instantaneous utility simply mirrors that of instantaneous consumption, declining 
by around 4% initially.  For the assumed value of  0.5 γ = , the initial decline in welfare for both 
internal and external shocks reflects the decline in absolute and relative consumption.  Thus welfare 
in the two cases immediately declines by around 6.5% and 7.5% respectively.  But with capital 
adjusting more rapidly with internal habits and most rapidly with external habits the initial decline in 24 
welfare is eliminated more rapidly as we move from the conventional, to the internal, to the external 
habits cases.  After about 15 years, the initial welfare ranking will be reversed.  Despite the rather 
different time profile of welfare costs, these are more or less offsetting, so that the intertemporal 
welfare losses of the destruction of capital with either inward-looking or outward-looking agents is 
around 2%, slightly higher than the 1.7% for the conventional utility function.   
One interesting contrast from the shock to productivity growth is that there is a greater 
divergence between the two specifications of time non-separable preferences, particularly during the 
early phases of the adjustments.  This is most clearly evident in the behavior of the savings rate, 
() () st yt , which begin to converge only after around 20 years. 
The analysis of this shock provides some interesting insight into the relationship between 
growth and savings.  Empirical evidence summarized by Carroll et al. (2000) suggests that growth 
leads to savings.  But conventional growth models have the property that growth and savings are 
contemporaneously related and cannot capture adequately this type of Granger-causal relationship.  
By contrast, comparing Figs. 2d and 2e in the two cases with time-separable preferences, we see that 
the initial increase in the growth rate from 1.5% to around 1.7% precedes the increase in the savings 
rate by several periods; i.e. growth leads savings, consistent with the empirical evidence.
22   
Intuitively, the initial destruction in the capital stock raises its marginal product.  Since the 
presence of a benchmark consumption level limits the initial reduction in consumption, the initial 
increase in the growth rate, following the capital loss, is slightly less than it would be if utility were 
time non-separable.  As agents become “habituated” to low levels of consumption, a large share of 
the additional output is saved, leading to a progressive increase in the savings rate.  As capital 
recovers, the marginal product of capital declines, reducing the growth rate of output and the savings 
rate, both of which now converge to their respective equilibrium.  The non-monotonic paths of both 
these variables is due to the “status effect”, which initially inhibits the decrease in consumption, 
together with the “rate of return effect”, which slows down the eventual decline in the growth rate. 
                                                 
22Carroll et al. (2000) also address the relationship between savings and growth in their model based on the AK 
technology.  Since this model generates only monotonic dynamics, they are unable to discuss the timing of the causality 
that our higher order dynamic model with its non-monotonic dynamics enables us to do.  Instead, they evaluate the 
derivative of the gross savings rate with respect to the growth rate of output (following an increase in productivity), 
showing that habits are likely to make the relationship between savings and growth more positive. 25 
5.  Some Sensitivity Analysis 
Our analysis has introduced two critical parameters: (i) the speed of adjustment of the 
reference stock, ρ , (ii) the weight of habit in preferences, γ .  We have conducted an extensive 
sensitivity analysis with respect to both parameters, allowing ρ  and γ  to vary from 0.2 to 5, and 0.2 
to 0.8, respectively (as in Table 5C).  The overall conclusion is that our results are generally robust 
with respect to plausible parameter changes and here we report only the main results.
23   
5.1  Speed of Adjustment of Reference Stock 
  Since the time-separable preferences are independent of both ρ  and γ , we need focus only 
on how the two types of habit formation change.  We may note that as  0 ρ →  or ρ →∞ the paths 
of the time non-separable economies converge to the conventional case.   
  We consider first the increase in the productivity growth rate from 0 to 2%.  The similar 
behavior exhibited by both inward-looking and outward-looking economies for the benchmark 
economy continues to prevail, and accordingly, we shall focus our attention on the former.   
Increasing  ρ  from 0.2 to 0.8 reduces the initial increase in consumption from 8.1% to 6.6%, so that 
the savings rate initially declines from 21.7% to 16.2% rather than to 15.3%.  Lower short-run 
consumption reduces welfare in the short run (relative to the benchmark), as greater resources are 
devoted to capital accumulation, and indeed, on impact, welfare increases by only 13.7%, rather than 
16.9%.  In the short term this increases the growth rate of output and the savings rate continues to 
fall.  At the same time, the initial more rapid rate of adjustment of habits reduces the consumption-
habits ratio, more than offsetting the positive effects of more consumption, so that after the initial 
increase, welfare falls during the first 2 periods.  However, over time, the increase in absolute 
consumption more than offsets the decline in relative consumption and welfare begins to rise.  As ρ  
increases further, the decline in welfare during the early phase becomes more pronounced. 
  The time paths for per capita capital stock, consumption, output, and the savings ratio are all 
generally insensitive to changes in ρ .  But since a larger ρ  implies that habits are adjusting to 
                                                 
23More detailed summary tables of our sensitivity analysis and illustrative graphs are available from the authors. 26 
current consumption at a faster rate, the relative consumption effects of welfare decline [cf (14)] 
with  ρ .  As a result, the overall welfare gains resulting from the productivity gain decline 
correspondingly.  These differences become substantial as γ  increases, and the role of habits 
increases in importance.  Thus, for example, if  0.2 γ = , the overall intertemporal welfare gains 
decline from 43.1% to 40.9% as ρ  increases from 0.2 to 5, whereas if  0.8 γ = , the corresponding 
decline is from 92.9% to 50.2%. 
  A similar sensitivity analysis in the case of a 10% destruction of capital has also been 
conducted.  The most striking feature is that increasing the speed of adjustment of the reference 
stock causes consumption to continue to decline following the initial shock, in the case of time non-
separable preferences, doing so for about 2 periods.  This has two effects on the “hump” in the 
savings ratio; it both accentuates it and pushes it forward in time, so that if  1.5 ρ =  it peaks after 
about 2-3 periods, rather than in about 10-12, as in the benchmark case.   
5.2  Weight of Habits in Preferences 
As  γ  declines toward zero, the contribution of relative consumption declines and the time 
non-separable specification converges to the conventional time separable case.  As γ  increases, the 
time non-separable economies respond to an increase in the productivity growth rate with smaller 
initial increases in consumption.  Intuitively, as the weight of relative consumption increases, smaller 
increases in the level of consumption are enough to achieve larger increases in instantaneous 
welfare.  The possibility of the time non-separable economies to substitute relative consumption for 
absolute consumption allows them to achieve larger increases in savings, capital accumulation and 
growth.  If  0.8 γ = , the weight assigned to relative consumption is so large that welfare initially 
increases by around 33.3% for internal habits, and over time, instantaneous welfare follows a path 
similar to Fig. 1g.  
In the case of the destruction of capital, an increase in the weight of relative consumption 
reduces the initial decline in consumption following the shock, in the case of time non-separable 
preferences.  At the same time, consumption continues to decline for several periods thereafter, 
particularly for the inward-looking economy.  The combination of these two effects tends to 27 
postpone but accentuate the “hump” in the savings ratio that this shock generates. 
6.   Time non-separable preferences: AK vs. neoclassical technology. 
As we noted at the outset, Carroll et al. (1997, 2000) examine the dynamics of the basic 
Rebelo (1991) endogenous growth model under time non-separable preferences.  The introduction of 
a second state variable, benchmark consumption, introduces transitional dynamics, so that in contrast 
to the conventional AK model, the economy is no longer always on its balanced growth path, but 
now exhibits transitional dynamics.  Nonetheless, the strong knife-edge conditions required to 
generate ongoing growth severely restrict the equilibrium dynamic behavior, essentially restricting it 
to monotonic adjustments exclusively driven by preference parameters.  
In this section we briefly compare the results of that model, with its assumed constant return 
to capital (and stationary population), with those of the present model and its more flexible 
production technology.  Carroll et al. have considered virtually the same two shocks as have we.  
The first is an increase in productivity, A, so as to raise the equilibrium growth rate from 1% to 2%, 
the second being the 10% destruction of capital.  To maximize comparability, we set  0 n = , 
0.05 β = , while assuming an initial labor productivity growth rate of 1%, thereby generating the 
same initial equilibrium growth rate of 1%. We then introduce a 1% increase in labor productivity 
growth, thus increasing the equilibrium growth rate to 2%.  We also follow them by setting  2 ε = , 
but all other parameters remain unchanged.  Since the behavior of each production technology – AK 
and neoclassical – is qualitatively similar across preference specifications we restrict our comparison 
to the “catching up with the Joneses” case.  Figures 3 and 4 compare the transitional adjustment 
paths in the two economies for both types of shocks.  The differences are striking in both cases, the 
growth rates, for example evolving in contrasting ways along the transitional paths.   
The differences in response to the productivity shock reflect the fact that they do not share 
precisely the same time profile, despite the fact that they both raise the long-run growth rate by 1%.  
In our model, with the declining productivity of capital, we require a sustained increase in the 
growth rate of productivity, in order to generate a permanently higher growth rate.  The effect of this 
takes place only gradually over time, as we have been discussing.  In contrast, for the AK 28 
technology, the increase in productivity, A, occurs fully on impact, and indeed productivity cannot 
grow over time for a balanced growth equilibrium to prevail.  As a result, the growth rate of capital 
in the AK model adjusts immediately, and indeed initially over-adjusts due to the inhibiting effect of 
the reference consumption stock on the initial adjustment to consumption.
 24   
Differences are also very pronounced for the destruction of capital shock (which is identical 
in the two cases).  In the AK case, an economy with initial capital-habit ratio below its steady-state 
level will have an initial low level of consumption. The saving, capital accumulation, output, and 
consumption growth rates will initially be low, monotonically approaching their initial steady state 
levels after 30 years.  But the more flexible neoclassical production technology predicts entirely 
different behavior.  The initial destruction of capital raises its marginal product leading to an 
immediate decrease in the level of consumption.  The higher level of savings leads to an increase in 
the rate of capital accumulation and this higher rate of investment results in a progressive recovery 
of output, capital, and consumption. With a constant rate of return to capital, saving and growth 
remain below their steady state levels along the transition, while if the rate of return to capital is 
endogenously determined, saving and growth over-shoot during the transition, and approach their 
steady state from above.
25   
The intuition behind these contradicting results rests on the different assumptions about the 
behavior of the marginal product of capital implied by each production technology. If the aggregate 
technology exhibits constant returns to capital, then its marginal product is independent of the level 
of capital, and therefore the saving-consumption decision is dominated by the predetermined 
reference stock.  After a destruction of physical capital, an agent with a high reference stock will try 
to prevent consumption from falling relative to the reference level, “the status effect”, consuming at 
an unsustainably high level while he allows the reference stock to adjust.  This higher consumption-
output ratio lowers the rates of saving, capital accumulation, and growth along the transition.  On the 
                                                 
24In a previous version of this paper we also compared the behavior of the two models in response to a one-time increase 
in productivity, as represented by α  in this model.  In this case we find that the behavior of the two economies is 
qualitatively similar during the transition.  The only difference is that in this model this shock has only a temporary 
effect on the growth rate, unlike the AK model where its effect is permanent.  The key factor determining the similarity 
or divergence in the behavior of the two models in response to a shock is the extent to which the dynamics in the present, 
more flexible, model are non-monotonic.   
25 The non-montonic adjustment to this shock may also occur in the Alonso-Carrera (2001b) model. 29 
other hand, if the aggregate technology exhibits diminishing returns to capital two counteracting 
effects drive the adjustment process.  As for the AK technology, the “status effect” is present, 
preventing a plunge in the level of consumption.  At the same time, the “rate of return effect” 
stimulates saving and capital accumulation.  For this chosen parameter set the “rate of return effect” 
dominates leading to a transition characterized by above-equilibrium levels of growth and saving, 
although the sensitivity analysis discussed earlier suggests that this need not always be the case. 
7.   Conclusions 
Recent empirical evidence has supported the importance of time non-separable preferences 
as an alternative to the conventional time separable utility function.  Given the convincing nature of 
this evidence it is important that its consequences for the dynamics and growth of the macro 
economy be well understood.  Previous research has focused almost entirely on the simplest AK 
growth model and this paper has examined the effects of introducing time non-separable preferences 
in the more flexible neoclassical growth framework.  
This analysis has been carried out with a twofold objective in mind.  First, we have compared 
the adjustment process of the key variables in our model, under three alternative preference 
specifications: (i) conventional time separable preferences, (ii) outward-looking preferences 
reflecting an attitude of “catching up with the Joneses”, and (iii) inward-looking preferences that 
reflect habit formation.  Because of the more general specifications of preferences and technology, 
most of our work has proceeded numerically, by calibrating a plausible macroeconomic model. 
The analysis yields important differences in the behavior of consumption and saving under 
the two specifications of time non-separable preferences, (ii) and (iii), relative to the conventional 
specification, (i).  These differences arise from the fact that the introduction of the reference stock 
ties the behavior of these variables to the past, thus limiting their ability to respond to a shock.  How 
much (ii) and (iii) deviate from one another during a transition depends on the shock.  Inward-
looking and outward-looking preferences track each other quite closely in response to an exogenous 
increase in productivity growth, with both deviating substantially from the time path generated by 
conventional preferences.  But for the other shock we consider, a destruction in the initial capital 30 
stock, (ii) and (iii) are less closely tied during the transition, especially in its early stages. 
The second aspect we consider is to contrast the effects of time non-separable preferences 
under alternative production structures.  We do this by comparing our results, obtained under a 
neoclassical production structure with those obtained under the restrictive AK technology.  The most 
striking aspect of this comparison is the sharply contrasting responses of the two models to a 10% 
destruction of capital.  Under the AK production structure, consumption, saving and the growth rate 
approach the new steady state monotonically from below. In contrast, our model predicts that both 
savings and the growth rate adjust non-monotonically, overshooting their long-run responses during 
the transition, consistent with empirical evidence provided by the post World War II experience of 
Europe and Japan.  This non-monotonic behavior is possible because of the higher dimensionality of 
the underlying dynamic system.  The intuition behind it lies in understanding the interacting forces at 
work.  The dynamics under time separable preferences are driven by what we have called the “rate 
of return effect”.  On the other hand, what we have called the “status effect” is the engine behind the 
adjustment process in the time non-separable AK model.  In our specification both effects play an 
important role during the adjustment process, combining to provide a flexible framework able to 
account for rich dynamic behavior. Table 1. 
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Table 3  
Eigenvalues and Modulus for Complex Roots 
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 Table 4 
 
Increase in g from 0% to 2% 
 








C.  Welfare Evaluation 
 
   

















Conventional 0  14.3 0  -51.87  50.66 128.2 121.1  95.1 
External habits  0  9.0  0  -32.46  74.6  134.1 132.8  128.1 
Internal habits  0  8.1  0  -29.29  74.4  134.0 132.7  128.1 
  Impact Steady  State 
  ˆ K  
 
ˆ Y  
 
() ch  () sy  ˆ K  
 
ˆ Y  
 
() ch  () sy 
Conventional -1.88  0.62  -  -11.3 2.0  2.0  -  -2.5 
External habits  -1.29  0.83  9.0  -7.0  2.0  2.0  10.0  -4.0 
Internal habits  -1.10  0.90  8.1  -6.4  2.0  2.0  10.0  -4.0 
 Impact 
%∆ 




Conventional 14.34  128.28  39.42 
External habits  18.76  157.31  53.26 
Internal habits  16.86  157.20  53.31 Table 5 
10% Destruction of capital 
 















C.  Sensitivity Analysis: Effect on Short-run Savings Ratio 
Percentage point change 
 
   0.2 γ =  0.5 γ =  0.8 γ =  
  Conventional  0.6 0.6  0.6 
External habits  0.4  0.1  -0.1  0.2 ρ =  
Internal habits  0.2  -0.3  -0.9 
External habits  0.4  0  -0.3  0.5 ρ =  
Internal habits  0.2  -0.4  -1.2 
External habits  0.3  0  -0.4  0.8 ρ =  
Internal habits  0.2  -0.5  -1.3 
External habits  0.3  -0.1  -0.5  1.5 ρ =  
Internal habits  0.2  -0.5  -1.4 
External habits  0.3  -0.1  -0.6  5 ρ =  
Internal habits  0.2  -0.5  -1.5 
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Conventional -10  -4.36  -3.62  -0.93  0.67  0.24  -  0.6 
External habits  -10  -3.83  -3.62  -2.88  0.56  0.20  -3.8  0.1 





Conventional -4.36  -1.72 
External habits -7.50  -2.02 












a) Time paths for per capita capital stock relative to base 










b) Time paths for per capita consumption relative to base 











c) Time paths for per capita savings relative to base  











d) Growth rate of output 








e) Time paths for savings rate 










f) Time paths for ratio of actual to reference cons.  









g) Time paths for instantaneous welfare 
 
 
  Conventional 
  External 
  Internal 
 










a) Time paths for per capita capital stock relative to base 









b) Time paths for per capita consumption relative to base 
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f) Time paths for ratio of actual to reference cons.   











g) Time paths for instantaneous welfare 
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Figure 2. Transitional dynamics after a 10% destruction of capital.  AK technology  Neoclassical technology 











































































Figure 3. Transitional dynamics after an increase in g or A, respectively, that leads to an increase in 
equilibrium growth from 1% to 2%.  AK technology  Neoclassical technology 






































































Figure 4. Transitional dynamics after a 10% destruction of capital under external habits.  
 A1 
Appendix 
A.1  Elimination of Non-Optimal Equilibrium 
We show how one of the solutions for capital, in the internal habit formation case violates a 
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Setting  0 c =   in (10b) and multiplying the resulting equation by (1− ρq
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That can be reduced to the following quadratic expression in  ( )
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We can factor this equation as follows 
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We now consider the transversality condition (6d), and note that it is equivalent to 
     1 ˆ ˆ 0 ii K λβ +− <        ( A . 7 )  
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Substituting the first root, (A.6a), we find  1 ˆ ˆ 0 ii Kg λβ ρ + −=+> .  This violates the transversality 
condition, and can therefore be eliminated.  The second root, (A.6b), satisfies (6d) if and only if 
() (1 ) 1 g γ εβ −−< , a sufficient condition for which is the empirically plausible condition,  1 ε > . 
Imposing this latter condition, as do Alonso-Carrera et al. (2001b), we find that the optimal steady-
state solution for capital in the presence of habit formation is given by (11a). 
A.2  Welfare Changes as Measured by Equivalent Variations in Income Flows 
  We assume that the economy is initially on a balanced growth path, (indexed by b) which is 
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where  cb,hb  are the constant ratios along the initial balanced growth path and  0 A  represents the 
initial level of technology which conditions all subsequent output and consumption levels.  The 
corresponding level of base welfare is given by A3 
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Evaluating (A.9) yields 
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  Now consider an equilibrium transitional path with steady-state growth rate  2 ng + .  Along 
such a path 
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  As a means of comparing these two levels of utility, we determine the percentage change in 
the initial level of technology,  0 A , and therefore in the consumption flow over the entire base path, 
such that the agent is indifferent between cb,hb  and ca,ha .  That is, we seek to find ζ  such that  
    00 (,; ) (,; ) bb aa a Wc h A Wc h A W ζ = =       ( A . 1 2 )  
Performing this calculation yields 
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and hence       
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(A.13) determines the change in the base consumption level, and thus in the consumption levels at 
all points of time that will enable the agent’s base level of intertemporal welfare to equal that 
following some structural change. A4 
  The relative welfare gain at any instant of time t along the transitional path (over the base 
level at the corresponding time) is calculated analogously, by 
    ()
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  Note that if the structural change involves a change in the steady-state growth rate the pre-
shock and post-shock welfare paths will diverge, ultimately growing at different rates.  Accordingly, 
the consumption level necessary to compensate for the change grows over time to reflect the growth 
differential.  This is not so with intertemporal utility, as long as  2 (1 )(1 )g γ εβ − −< , as in our 
simulations, so that intertemporal utility remains finite. 
  The change in instantaneous welfare, (A.15), can also be written as 
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which brings out the fact that as long as  0 γ > , welfare differentials depend upon absolute as well as 
relative consumption. 
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